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1ARTICLE X :  SOME BUILDING BLOCKS
by Graham S. Pearson
Introduction
1.   The Ad Hoc Group (AHG) of the States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention (BTWC) has the consideration of measures to implement Article X of the
Convention as an element of its mandate agreed by the Special Conference in September
1994.   The AHG has considered how to address this at each of its substantive meetings with
a Friend of the Chair, initially Ambassador Jorge Berguno of Chile and subsequently, Carlos
Duarte of Brazil carrying out this responsibility.   As progress is being made on the
development of the rolling text for the Protocol to strengthen the Convention, it is timely to
consider how the implementation of Article X might contribute to the strengthening of the
effectiveness of the Convention.
2.    This Briefing Paper considers some of the developments that have occurred nationally,
regionally and internationally in respect of the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and
toxins for peaceful purposes.    It has become apparent that there is increasing awareness
world-wide because of public health and environmental concerns of the need to control the
handling, use, storage and transfer of such biological agents.   This paper examines some of
the current controls and regulations for biological agents and the international initiatives that
are ongoing to strengthen biosafety around the world.    These are seen as building blocks
which might be considered from a point of view of strengthening the BTWC as well as
contributing to the implementation of Article X although care will need to be taken in the
Protocol for the AHG to avoid unnecessary duplication with other international activities.
The challenging goal is to identify how these other national, regional and international
activities can be utilised to contribute to the strengthening of the BTWC.
Ad Hoc Group
3.    The Final Report of the Special Conference of States Parties to the BTWC in September
19941 stated that:
"the Conference, determined to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the
implementation of the Convention and recognizing that effective verification could
reinforce the Convention, decides to establish an Ad Hoc Group, open to all States
Parties.   The objective of this Ad Hoc Group shall be to consider appropriate
measures, including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen
the Convention, to be included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument, to be
submitted for the consideration of the States Parties."
It went on to say that "In this context, the Ad Hoc Group shall, inter alia, consider:
....
                                                
1United Nations, Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, Final Report, BWC/SPCONF/1 Geneva, 19–30 September 1994.
2- Specific measures designed to ensure effective and full implementation of Article X,
which also avoid any restrictions incompatible with the obligations undertaken under
the Convention, noting that the provisions of the Convention should not be used to
impose restrictions and/or limitations on the transfer for purposes consistent with the
objectives and the provisions of the Convention of scientific knowledge, technology,
equipment and materials."
4.   Article X of the BTWC2 states that:
"(1)   The States Parties to this Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right
to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific
and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and
toxins for peaceful purposes.   Parties to the Convention in a position to do so shall
also cooperate in contributing individually or together with other States or
international organisations to the further development  and application of scientific
discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for the prevention of disease, or for
other peaceful purposes.
(2)   This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering
the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or
international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological)
activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents
and toxins and equipment for the processing, use or production of bacteriological
(biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the
provisions of the Convention."
The Ad Hoc Group in its meetings has addressed Article X measures and a number of
working papers have been provided on the subject of such measures.   It is clear that in
considering possible measures to strengthen the Convention and improve its effectiveness, it
is necessary to do so in the light of the ongoing developments nationally, regionally and
internationally in regard to the use of bacteriological (biological) agents for peaceful
purposes.   This Briefing Paper aims to contribute to this process.
The Use of Biological Agents for Peaceful Purposes
5.   The past two decades has seen immense developments in the peaceful uses of biological
agents in the field of biotechnology.   The Final Declaration of the Fourth Review
Conference3 held on 25 November to 6 December 1996 in its statement of Article X declared
that
"The Conference once more emphasizes the increasing importance of the provisions
of Article X, especially in the light of recent scientific and technological developments
in the field of biotechnology, bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for
peaceful applications, which have vastly increased the potential for cooperation
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3United Nations, Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
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3between States to help, promote economic and social development, and scientific and
technological progress, particularly in the developing countries, in conformity with
their interests, needs and priorities."
However, the past two decades have also seen an increased international awareness of the
potential dangers to public health and to the environment.   This was typified by the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development4 held in Rio de Janeiro on 3 to 14
June 1992 which declared a series of Principles and agreed Agenda 21 which addressed the
pressing problems of today and also aims at preparing the world for the challenges of the next
century.   It reflected a global consensus and political commitment at the highest level on
development and environment cooperation.
6.  Agenda 21 includes one Chapter (16) entitled "Environmentally Sound Management of
Biotechnology" -- throughout Agenda 21 the term "environmentally sound" means
"environmentally safe and sound", in particular when applied to the terms
"technology/technologies".   Chapter 16 states5 that
"Biotechnology is the integration of the new techniques emerging from modern
biotechnology with the well-established approaches of traditional biotechnology.
Biotechnology, an emerging knowledge-intensive field, is a set of enabling techniques
for bringing about specific man-made changes in deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), or
genetic material, in plants, animals and microbial systems, leading to useful products
and technologies....Nevertheless, it promises to make a significant contribution in
enabling the development of, for example, better health care, enhanced food security
through sustainable agricultural practices, improved supplies of potable water, ...."
Chapter 16 sets out programme areas "to foster internationally agreed principles to be
applied to ensure the environmentally sound management of biotechnology, to engender
public trust and confidence, to promote the development of sustainable applications of
biotechnology and to establish appropriate enabling mechanisms, especially within
developing countries, through the following activities:
(a) Improving the availability of food, feed and renewable raw materials;
(b) Improving human health;
(c) Enhancing protection of the environment
(d) Enhancing safety and developing international mechanisms for cooperation;
(e) Establishing enabling mechanisms for the development and the environmentally
sound application of biotechnology."
                                                
4United Nations, Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,  Rio de Janeiro,
3- 14 June 1992, A/CONF.151/26, 12 August 1992.    See also Earth Summit '92,  The United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro 1992, Regency Press, London, 1992.
5United Nations, Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,  Rio de Janeiro,
3- 14 June 1992, A/CONF.151/26, Volume II, Page 111, 13 August 1992.
47.   Separate sections of Chapter 16 address each of the above.   Section D on "Enhancing
Safety and Developing International Mechanisms for Cooperation" in its Basis for Action6
states that:
There is a need for further development of internationally agreed principles on risk
assessment and management of all aspects of biotechnology which should build upon
those developed at the national level.   Only when adequate and transparent safety
and border-control procedures are in place will the community at large be able to
derive maximum benefit from, and be in a much better position to accept the
potential benefits and risks of, biotechnology.   Several fundamental principles could
underlie many of these safety procedures, including primary consideration of the
organism, building on the principle of familiarity, applied in a flexible framework,
taking into account national requirements and recognizing that the logical
progression is to start with a step-by-step and case-by-case approach, but also
recognising that experience has shown that in many instances a more comprehensive
approach should be used, based on the experiences of the first period, leading, inter
alia, to streamlining and categorizing;  complimentary consideration of risk
assessment and risk management;  and classification into contained use or release to
the environment. [Emphasis added].
There is thus a highly relevant, from a BTWC point of view, emphasis on "adequate and
transparent safety and border-control procedures".
8.   The objectives of Section D are set out as follows:
The aim of this programme area is to ensure safety in biotechnology development,
application, exchange and transfer through international agreement on principles to
be applied on risk assessment and management, with particular reference to health
and environmental considerations, including the widest possible public participation
and taking account of ethical considerations.
The activities to achieve this objective are detailed and include the following:
Governments... should:
(a) Make the existing safety procedures widely available by collecting the
existing information and adapting it to the specific needs of different countries
and regions;
(b) Further develop, as necessary, the existing safety procedures to promote
scientific development and categorization in the areas of risk assessment and
risk management (information requirements;  databases;  procedures for
assessing risks and conditions of release;  establishment of safety conditions;
monitoring and inspections, taking account of ongoing national, regional and
international initiatives and avoiding duplication wherever possible);
(c) Compile, update and develop compatible safety procedures into a
framework of internationally agreed principles as a basis for guidelines to be
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5applied on safety in biotechnology, including consideration of the need for
and feasibility of an international agreement, and promote information
exchange as a basis for further development, drawing on the work already
undertaken by international or other expert bodies; ....[Emphasis added]
Again from the BTWC point of view, the references to information requirements,
establishment of safety conditions and monitoring and inspections are relevant.
9.  The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)7 was opened for signature at the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992 and
entered into force in December 1993.   By 16 November 1997, this Convention had been
ratified by 171 countries8.  The Objectives of this Convention are set out in Article I as being
"...the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and
the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic
resources, including by appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate
transfer of relevant technologies, taking into account all rights over those resources
and to technologies, and by appropriate funding."
The terms "biotechnology" and "technology" are defined in Article II as follows:
"Biotechnology" means any technological application that uses biological systems,
living organisms, or derivatives thereof, to make or modify products or processes for
specific use.
"Technology" includes biotechnology.
10.   Various Articles of the CBD address topics of relevance to the strengthening of the
BTWC and to Article X of the BTWC.   Two particular ones are Article 16 "Access to and
Transfer of Technology" and Article 19 "Handling of Biotechnology and Distribution of its
Benefits".
11.  Article 16 "Access to and Transfer of Technology" states in its first paragraph that:
"1.   Each Contracting Party, recognizing that technology includes biotechnology,
and that both access to and transfer of technology among Contracting Parties are
essential elements for the attainment of the objectives of this Convention, undertakes
subject to the provisions of this Article to provide and/or facilitate access for and
transfer to other Contracting Parties of technologies that are relevant to the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity or make use of genetic
resources and do not cause significant damage to the environment."
In subsequent paragraphs it goes to recognize the need to protect information that is the
subject of patents or intellectual property rights by saying:
"2.  Access to and transfer of technology...to developing countries shall be provided
and/or facilitated under fair and most favourable terms.... In the case of technology
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UNEP/CBD/94/1, Geneva, November 1994.  Also available as HMSO, Cm 2127, January 1993.
8Convention on Biological Diversity, Ratification Status, available at http://www.biodiv.org/conv/ratify.html
6subject to patents and other international property rights, such access and transfer
shall be provided on terms which recognize and are consistent with the adequate and
effective protection of intellectual property rights...."
and that
"3.   Each Contracting Party shall take legislative, administrative or policy measures,
as appropriate, with the aim that Contracting Parties, in particular those that are
developing countries, which provide genetic resources are provided access to and
transfer of technology, which makes use of those resources, on mutually agreed terms,
including technology protected by patents and other intellectual property rights,
where necessary,..."
The final paragraph of Article 16 states that:
"5.  The Contracting Parties, recognizing that patents and other intellectual property
rights may have an influence on the implementation of this Convention, shall co-
operate in this regard subject to national legislation and international law in order to
ensure that such rights are supportive of and do not run counter to its objectives."
12.   Article 19 "Handling of Biotechnology and Distribution of its Benefits" addresses the
distribution of the benefits of biotechnology and goes on in its third and fourth paragraphs to
address safety and transfer aspects:
"3.   The Parties shall consider the need for and the modalities of a protocol setting
out appropriate procedures, including, in particular, advance informed agreement,
in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of any living modified organism
resulting from biotechnology which may have adverse effect on the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity."
"4.   Each Contracting Party shall, directly or by requiring any natural or legal
person under its jurisdiction providing the organisms referred to in paragraph 3
above, provide any available information about the use and safety regulations
required by that Contracting Party in handling such organisms, as well as available
information on the potential adverse impact of the specific organisms concerned to
the Contracting party into which those organisms are to be introduced." [Emphasis
added]
13.   The implementation of the CBD has been taken forward by Conferences of the Parties
which were required in accordance with Article 23 to meet not less than one year after the
entry into force of the Convention and to keep under review the implementation of the
Convention.
14.  The first Conference of the Parties to the CBD was held in Nassau, Bahamas from 28
November to 9 December 1994.   It decided to establish an Open-ended Ad Hoc Group of
Experts on Biosafety with a mandate
"(a) to consider the need for and modalities of a protocol setting out appropriate
procedures, including, in particular, advance informed agreement, in the field of safe
transfer, handling and use of any living modified organism resulting from
7biotechnology that may have an adverse effect on the conservation and sustainable
user of biological diversity; and
(b) to consider existing knowledge, experience and legislation in the field of biosafety,
including the views of Parties, subregional, regional and international organizations,
with a view to presenting a report for consideration at the second meeting of the
Conference of the Parties, so as to enable the Conference of the Parties to reach an
informed decision as to the need for and the modalities of a protocol."
In addition, the Conference of the Parties also decided to establish a panel of 15 Government-
nominated experts assisted by UNIDO, UNEP. FAO and WHO to prepare a background
document for consideration by the Open-ended Ad Hoc Group of Experts.   The panel met in
Cairo from 1 to 5 May 1995 and produced a report9 which noted the specific provision made
for "Environmentally Sound Management of Biotechnology" in Chapter 16 of Agenda 21
remarking that:
"The contribution that safety in biotechnology can make to the successful global
development of the technology depends on the extent of international information
exchange, cooperation, harmonization, and agreement, and on the extent to which
countries are able to take advantage of mechanisms for safety."
The report went on to note that
"The development of new techniques of genetic modification in the early 1970s
prompted a thorough discussion on safety in biotechnology which resulted in a
number of national and international recommendations, guidelines and legislation.
By the mid 1980s it was widely considered that recombinant DNA techniques were an
extension of conventional genetic procedures and that organisms produced by this
technology present risks that can be the same in kind as those posed by any other
organism.   It was also recognised that the potential benefits of biotechnology were
increased because the new molecular techniques allowed a greater diversity of genes
to be introduced into organisms.   However, it was considered that it would be
appropriate to develop the technology in a precautionary manner.
Modern biotechnology has now been developed and applied for over 20 years under
contained conditions and over eight years for applications in the environment.   Given
the rapid development of the use of this technology and taking into account the
knowledge and experience gained so far, an international framework to provide for
safety in biotechnology, as called for in Agenda 21, was now opportune." [Emphasis
added]
15.  The panel reviewed existing international and regional guidelines/agreements on
biosafety and identified needs for additional action in several areas such as the need for
immediate action by countries which have not adopted specific regulations for biosafety or
have not used existing legislation to promulgate regulations for biosafety.   Furthermore,
whilst some efforts art regional harmonization have been undertaken or are underway, such
regional harmonization was not occurring on a global basis and the panel felt that such action
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UNEP/CBD/COP/2/7, 3 August 1995: Annex IV, Report of the Panel of Experts on Biosafety.
8should be initiated in those regions where it has not yet begun.  The panel drew several main
conclusions which included the following:
"The Panel strongly believes that capacity building is essential to ensure adequate
capacities to implement effectively biosafety regulations at the national level in a way
which also promotes safe development in the field of biotechnology."
and
"The Panel also strongly believes that immediate action is needed to excess existing
biosafety frameworks including their ability to address the movement of LMOs [living
modified organisms] across national boundaries and to address other related
transboundary issues.   The Panel finds that such issues are best addressed by an
appropriate international framework."
16.   The panel report was considered by the Open-ended Ad Hoc Group of Experts on
Biosafety which met in Madrid from 24 to 28 July 1995/   Its report10 was considered by the
second Conference11 of the Parties to the CBD when they met in Jakarta on 6 to 17 November
1995 which agreed Decision II/5 stating that the Conference of the Parties
"1.   Decides to seek solution to the above mentioned concerns [about safety in
biotechnology] through a negotiation process to develop in the field of safe transfer,
handling and use of living modified organisms, a protocol on biosafety, specifically
focussing on transboundary movement, of any living modified organisms resulting
from modern biotechnology that may have adverse effect on the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity, setting out for consideration, in particular,
appropriate procedure for advance informed agreement;
2.  Decides to establish an Open-ended Ad Hoc Working Group under the Conference
of parties which shall operate in accordance with the terms of reference in the annex
to this decision;"
The annex states that the "Ad Hoc Working Group should endeavour to complete its work in
1998."
17.  This decision also stressed the importance of the urgent finalisation of the United Nations
Environmental Programme International Technical Guidelines on Safety on Biotechnology
noting that "guidelines on biosafety...may be used as an interim mechanism during the
development of the protocol and to complement it after its completion, for the purposes of
facilitating the development of national capacities to assess and manage risks, establish
adequate information systems and develop expert human resources in biotechnology."
                                                
10Convention on Biological Diversity, Report of the Open-Ended Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Biosafety,
UNEP/CBD/COP/2/7, 3 August 1995.
11Convention on Biological Diversity,  Report of the Second Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the
Convention on Biological Diversity, Jakarta, 6 - 17 November 1995, UNEP/CBD/COP/2/19 dated 30 November
1995.
918.   The Open-ended Ad Hoc Working Group met for the first time in Aarhus, Denmark
from 22 to 26 July 1996 and reported12 to the Third meeting of the Conference of the Parties
to the CBD which met in Buenos Aires, Argentina on 4 - 15 November 1996.   The
Conference of the Parties in its decision III/2013 affirmed its "support for a two track
approach through which the promotion of the application of the UNEP Technical Guidelines
for Safety in Biotechnology can contribute to the development and implementation of a
protocol on biosafety, without prejudicing the development and conclusion of such a
protocol"  and decided that "two meetings of the Open-ended Ad Hoc Working Group would
be held in 1997 and that a sufficient number of meetings will be held in 1998 to allow the
Working Group to complete its work in 1998."
19.  Advance Informed Agreement/Biosafety Protocol.  Two meetings of the Open-ended
Ad Hoc Working Group on Biosafety were held in 1997 both in Montreal, Canada.   The first
was on 12 to 16 May 199714 and the second on 13 to 17 October 199715 at which the draft
protocol was further developed.   In order to complete the work on the draft protocol by the
end of 1998, three meetings are planned:
a.  An eight day working meeting from 9 to 18 February 1998 in Montreal
b.  A two-week meeting in the second half of July 1998
c.  A one-week meeting at the beginning of December 1988 to be followed by a two-
day (Monday-Tuesday) extraordinary meeting of the Conference of Parties
The consolidated text of the draft articles for the "Biosafety Protocol" is provided as an
Annex to the Report of the Third Meeting;  it  comprises some 43 Articles together with
Annexes.   It is interesting to note the approach being adopted is different from using square
brackets in that  a number of Options are simply listed under each heading.   Thus there are 5
Options listed for the Title of the protocol and for the Preamble, nine unanswered questions
appear first and are followed by the text for three options.   It has to be said that the square
bracket approach is much easier to assimilate than that of complete alternative texts.
20.   The language for the Objective of the Protocol in Article 1 is presented as 8 options;
some of these emphasise that "the objective of this Protocol is to promote the safe
transboundary movement of living modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology"
whilst others emphasise that "the objective of this Protocol is to ensure the safe transfer,
handling and use of living modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology that may
have adverse effect on the environment".   Articles 3 to 10 all relate to the Advance Informed
Agreement (AIA) procedure and its requirements for notification and decision.   There is also
an intention that the AIA procedure should be carried out in a transparent manner and Article
22 addresses "Public Awareness/Public Participation" although the 5 options listed range
from "No provisions necessary" through to options in which "each Contracting Party shall
                                                
12Convention on Biological Diversity, Elaboration of a Protocol on Biosafety, Progress Report,
UNEP/CBD/COP/3/27, 16 September 1996.
13Convention on Biological Diversity,  Report of the Third Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the
Convention on Biological Diversity, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 4 - 15 November 1996, UNEP/CBD/COP/3/38
dated 11 February 1997.
14Convention on Biological Diversity, Report of the Second Meeting of the Open-ended Working Group on
Biosafety, UNEP/CBD/BSWG/2/6, 16 May 1997.
15Convention on Biological Diversity, Report of the Third Meeting of the Open-ended Working Group on
Biosafety, UNEP/CBD/BSWG/3/6, 17 October 1997.
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take appropriate measures to ensure to the extent practicable, that the public has appropriate
access to information related to the implementation of this protocol, whilst respecting
confidential commercial information" to an option which would "provide the public which is
likely to be affected by any activity or product involving modified living organisms, an
opportunity for public hearings in the process of approving the release, transfer or use,
contained or otherwise, of such living modified organisms".
21.  UNEP International Technical Guidelines for Safety in Biotechnology.  A joint
initiative taken by the UK and the Netherlands following the Rio summit in June 1992 has
been to develop guidelines on safety in biotechnology.    These guidelines were then taken
forward by UNEP and developed into their International Guidelines.    These are the second
approach endorsed by the Committee of Parties to the CBD in parallel with the Biosafety
Protocol; namely for the finalisation and application of the UNEP International Technical
Guidelines for Safety in Biotechnology.   This was promoted by the decision 18/36 on
Biosafety made by the Governing Council of UNEP on 26 May 199516 which affirmed the
"desirability of the United Nations Environment Programme contributing to
international efforts on biosafety while avoiding duplication with other international
activities currently being undertaken by other organizations....
1.   Welcomes the United Nations Environment Programme initiative to hold
consultations on International Technical Guidelines for Safety in
Biotechnology and Related Capacity-Building Requirements;
2.  Notes with appreciation that three regional expert consultations on
International Technical Guidelines for Safety in Biotechnology and Related
Capacity-Building Requirements have so far been held and that further
regional consultations are planned;....
4.   Endorses and supports United Nations Environment Programme
sponsorship of regional consultations on International Technical Guidelines
for Safety in Biotechnology and Related Capacity-Building Requirements...."
22.   The International Guidelines were adopted by a meeting of the Global Consultation of
Government-designated Experts held in Cairo, Egypt from 11 to 14 December 1995 and
issued by UNEP17.    The foreword to the International Guidelines by Elizabeth Dowdeswell,
Executive Director of UNEP, emphasises the linkage between the application of the
Guidelines and the capacity-building that is essential for their implementation as being both
obvious and inevitable.   It goes on to say that:
"Indeed, it is vital and urgent for countries and regions to acquire the various
relevant capacities to implement the Guidelines.   Neither these Guidelines or the
biosafety protocol currently under development will in or of themselves ensure safety
in biotechnology development, research and application.   Consequently, the national
and regional capacity-building programmes that are necessary for the effective
implementation of these Guidelines should be formulated and given adequate
                                                
16United Nations Environment Programme, Proceedings of the Governing Council at its Eighteenth Session,
Nairobi, 15 - 26 May 1995, UNEP/GC. 18/40, 13 June 1995.
17United Nations Environment Programme,  UNEP International Technical Guidelines for Safety in
Biotechnology, UNEP Nairobi, Kenya.
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technical and financial support on a priority basis.   Founded on sound scientific
principles, their implementation needs to be undertaken with technical competence,
logical consistency and judicious urgency."
" UNEP has formulated such a programme as part of its  1996-1997 programme of
work.   It incorporates components and proposals for funding by, among others, the
Global Environment facility (GEF), through which developing countries and
countries with economies in transitions will receive the technical and financial
support to develop and/or strengthen their national biosafety frameworks which will
permit the effective implementation of these Guidelines and any future international
agreement on biosafety within a harmonized regional and global context."
23.  The Foreword goes on to outline essential elements of the role of the national biosafety
frameworks:
"The development of the national biosafety frameworks called for in the Guidelines
will entail technical and financial support to Governments and relevant in-country or
regional entities.  Such support is essential in order to:
* Establish or strengthen national authorities or national institutional biosafety
mechanisms;
*  Review national legislative, administrative and policy measures on biosafety;....
* Enhance public awareness of biotechnology risks... through initiatives involving the
community at large, policy makers, legislators, administrators, the private sector and
the biotechnology industry;"
24.  The Preface to the guidelines makes it clear that they have been developed on the basis of
common elements and principles derived from relevant existing regional and international
instruments and national regulations and guidelines.   The Introduction sets the scene, using
language that is closely similar to that in the report of the Open-ended Ad Hoc Group of
Experts which met in Cairo from 1 to 5 May 1995 (see para 14 above), noting that:
"The development of new techniques of genetic modification in the early 1970s
prompted a thorough discussion on safety in biotechnology which resulted in a
number of national and international recommendations, guidelines and legislation.
By the mid 1980s it was widely considered that recombinant DNA techniques were an
extension of conventional genetic procedures and that organisms produced by this
technology presented risks that were similar in kind to those posed by any other
organism.   But, while it was also recognised that the potential benefits of
biotechnology were greater because of the new molecular techniques which allowed a
greater diversity of genes to be introduced into organisms, the relative lack of
experience with such organisms nevertheless indicated that it would be appropriate to
develop the technology in a precautionary  and judicious manner. [Emphasis added]
The Introduction states that "The Guidelines address the human health and environmental
safety of all types of applications of biotechnology, from research and development to
commercialization of biotechnological products containing or consisting of organisms with
novel trait(s)."
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25.   The Guidelines comprise some six chapters and seven Annexes:
I. Introduction
II.  General Principles and Considerations
III. Assessment and Management of Risks
IV.  Providing for Safety:  Mechanisms at National and Regional Level
V.  Providing for Safety:  Mechanisms at International Level using Information
Supply and Exchange
VI.  Capacity-Building
One Annex addresses "Possible Mechanisms for Providing Information to the Public".
26.  Although it is clear that the Guidelines were prepared to focus primarily on living
modified organisms, the General Principles and Considerations make it clear that the basis for
safety in biotechnology rests on the characteristics of the basic organisms together with
consideration of the newly introduced traits.   Annex 3 of the International Guidelines is
entitled "Risk Assessment:  Examples of Points to Consider, as Appropriate"  which makes it
clear that:
The impacts to be considered include those on human health, agricultural production,
other organisms and the quality of the environment.
It goes on to outline the information required for a scientifically sound risk assessment which
includes
"INFORMATION RELATING TO THE ORGANISM WITH NOVEL TRAITS
Characteristics of the organism from which the organism with novel traits is derived:
The relevant biological, physiological and genetic and environmental characteristics
of the recipient/parental/host organism include, as appropriate:
* the name and identity of the organism
* pathogenicity, toxicity and allergenicity (in the case of micro-organisms it
should be noted that there are internationally accepted classification lists for
human pathogens.   Similar lists exist at national level for plant and animal
pathogens);...
INFORMATION RELATING TO THE INTENDED USE
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POTENTIAL RECEIVING ENVIRONMENT"
27.   The Chapter on Mechanisms at National and Regional Level emphasises the importance
of establishing, designating or strengthening "national and/or regional authorities/national
institutional mechanisms for oversight and/or control of the use of organisms with novel
13
traits."  It notes that "the authority or mechanism should have, or have access to, the relevant
scientific and technical knowledge and experience."    It says that:
"Effective oversight mechanisms require that: a risk assessment has been done;  or
the organism has been exempted from oversight on the basis of experience and
knowledge;  relevant users supply to the authority/national institutional mechanism
all required relevant information or appropriate references;  users record the
outcome of relevant activities and inform the authority/national institutional
mechanism of the outcome when required.   In particular, they should provide
relevant information if there is an unexpected or adverse effect on human health or
environmental impact during, or as a result of, the notified use."
It goes on to say that "Mechanisms for oversight and/or control can include prior notification
to the authority/national institutional mechanism of contained use facilities and certain
contained uses and releases of organisms with novel traits."   If such prior notification is
required, then "such notification may or may not require a positive decision from the
authority/national institutional mechanism before the notified use can proceed."   The Chapter
then addresses public participation:
"As set out in Agenda 21 and relevant provisions of the Convention on Biological
Diversity, authorities/national institutional mechanisms are responsible for
encouraging public participation by allowing access to information on which
decisions are based, whilst respecting confidential commercial information."
[Emphasis added]
28.   The Chapter on Mechanisms at International Level focuses on information exchange and
supply.   It states that "Countries are encouraged to participate in the exchange of general
information about national biosafety mechanisms...".   It goes on to note that "Countries,
organizations and companies will wish to be aware of which countries have adopted similar
measures to those set down in these guidelines to facilitate the exchange of mutually
acceptable data and assessments.   This form of information exchange can be carried out
through direct information exchange, as well as through the creation of an international
register or database."  The chapter then addresses the supply of information related to
transboundary transfer of organisms with novel traits outlining the information to be provided
and the concept of the advance informed agreement process.
29.   The nineteenth meeting of the UNEP Governing Council in Nairobi, Kenya in
January/February 1997 agreed Decision 19/16 on biosafety.   This welcomed the adoption of
the UNEP International Technical Guidelines for Safety in Biotechnology and also welcomed
the decisions taken by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological
Diversity by which the Conference affirmed its support for the two track approach through
which the promotion of the application of the UNEP International Technical Guidelines for
Safety in Biotechnology can contribute to the development and implementation of a protocol
on biosafety.   It urged:
"Governments to promote safety in biotechnology at the regional and global levels by
contributing relevant information to the International Register on Biosafety of the
United Nations Environment Programme and by using all available mechanisms,
drawing attention to the International Register, to implement the international
information exchange provisions of the UNEP International Technical Guidelines for
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Safety in Biotechnology, particularly with regard to the exchange of general
information about national biosafety mechanisms..."
It then requested that the Executive Director of UNEP
...continue to promote the implementation of the UNEP International Technical
Guidelines for Safety in Biotechnology , particularly in the developing countries, by
carrying out such activities at the internatiuonal, subregional and regional levels
developed in consultation with the involved parties and organizations.....
...explore with other United nations and international bodies the mutual sharing of
information about organisms with novel traits that is contained in international
databases and the rationalization of these databases, in order to avoid the duplication
of sources of information and the need for multiple entry of data.
30.   Analysis.  It is thus apparent that the UNEP International Technical Guidelines for
Safety in Biotechnology are being widely promoted and are seen as being complementary to
the Biosafety Protocol which whilst particularly addressing advance informed agreement for
transboundary transfers also includes Articles on Risk Assessment, Risk Management,
Minimum National Standards and on Information Sharing/Biosafety Clearing House.
Although all of this is aimed at micro-organisms with novel traits, the risks are all based
primarily on the baseline micro-organism and how the novel traits amend the risks.
Internationally, there is a move, certainly for micro-organisms with novel traits, towards
information exchange and for information supply should such micro-organisms be transferred
from one country to another.   There is also clear encouragement for the provision of
information to the public, whilst protecting commercial confidential information.    All of this
helps to build confidence nationally, regionally and internationally that such micro-organisms
are being handled, used and transferred in safe ways for permitted purposes -- and in this way
contributes to building confidence in compliance with the BTWC.
31.   Regional Safety in Biotechnology Meetings.   There has been reference above to
UNEP Governing Council decisions which endorsed and supported United Nations
Environment Programme sponsorship of regional consultations on International Technical
Guidelines for Safety in Biotechnology and Related Capacity-Building Requirements.    There
have been a series of such Regional Consultations:
a.  African Regional Conference for International Cooperation on Safety in
Biotechnology, 11 - 14 October 1993, Harare, Zimbabwe;
b.  Biodiversity and Harmonization of Biosafety of the Countries of the CORECA, 28
February - 3 March 1995, San Jose, Costa Rica;
c.  Asia-Pacific Workshop on Safety in Biotechnology, 6 - 8 March 1995, Bangkok,
Thailand;
d.  Central and Eastern European Conference for Regional and International
Cooperation on Safety in Biotechnology, 4 - 6 September 1995, Keszthely, Hungary;
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e.  Second Central and Eastern European Conference for Regional and International
Cooperation on Safety in Biotechnology, 16 - 18 October 1996, Smolenice, Slovak
Republic.
Most if not all of these have been organized with the support of the Netherlands Ministry of
Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment and several have been supported by the UK
Department of the Environment and the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Environment, Youth
and Family Affairs.
32.  African Regional Conference.  This Conference was attended by 50 participants from
11 African countries and 20 international experts who discussed how to ensure international
cooperation on the safe application of biotechnology.   The Conference was organised into
four main sections:
1.  General Introduction which set the overall scene
2.  Existing Safety Mechanisms which included OECD, EEC and several national
presentations
3.  National and Regional Needs, Constraints and Priorities
4.  National and Regional Implementation
The proceedings18 of the Conference provide a useful overview of both the current state of
the art in developed countries and in developing countries in Africa with papers on
Zimbabwe, Kenya, South Africa, Uganda and Tanzania.   Other papers address the OECD,
the EEC, Latin-America and North America.   It is clear that there is a common goal that is
internationally seeking to improve the provisions for safety in biotechnology.
33.   A useful summary is provided by the Conference Statement which stated that:
The aim of the Conference was to contribute to international cooperation on safety in
biotechnology, with specific attention to national implementation, regional and
international cooperation and harmonization.
It went on to say that
The Conference concluded that safety in biotechnology should be considered in the
development and application of biotechnology in the countries of Southern and
Eastern Africa, as a matter of urgency.... The participants wish to urge the
Governments of Southern and Eastern Africa to facilitate and give priority to
biotechnology policies including safety mechanisms in each of the countries.   Safety
mechanisms should include guidelines and/or regulations, as well as biosafety
committees at the national and institutional level, and should be adapted to specific
national circumstances.
The limitation to Southern and Eastern Africa reflected the geographical location of the 11
African countries which participated.
                                                
18Proceedings African Regional Conference for International Cooperation on Safety in Biotechnology, 11 - 14
October 1993, Harare, Zimbabwe.
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34.   Other Regional Workshops were held in Cartagena, Columbia and in San Jose, Costa
Rica.
35.  Asia-Pacific Workshop.   This Conference was attended by 67 participants from 16
counties in the Asia - Pacific region together with experts from the Netherlands, UK,
Zimbabwe and the United Nations.   The structure was similar to that of the African Regional
Conference in that it was divided into some six sections:
I.  State of the Art of Biotechnology and Biosafety in Asia-Pacific;
II.  Regional Cooperation on Safety in Biotechnology;
III.  International Harmonization of Biosafety Regulation and its Importance to
Developing Countries;
IV.  Risk Assessment and Risk Management in Biotechnology;
V.  Computer Demonstration on Risk Assessment and BINAS;
VI.  Working Groups on Case Studies.
The proceedings19 of the Conference provide a useful overview of both the current state of
the art in the countries in Asia-Pacific with separate papers on ASEAN countries, Thailand,
Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Australia, Japan, Pakistan, Singapore and Vietnam.   Other
papers address the situation in Southern Africa, North America, Latin America and Europe.
It is again clear that there is a common goal that is internationally seeking to improve the
provisions for safety in biotechnology.
36.   The final recommendations adopted by the participants at the workshop for taking
forward biosafety in the region noted that
The aim of the workshop was to contribute to international cooperation on safety in
biotechnology, with specific attention to national implementation, regional and
international cooperation and harmonization.
and the recommendations included:
* Promote harmonised or equivalent approaches to risk assessment and risk
management at the regional and international level;
* Promote the adoption of guidelines and/or the amendment of existing legislation if
appropriate...;
* Ensure that appropriate information is provided to national authorities about
organisms derived from modern biotechnology and the potential receiving
environment;
* Promote the development of mutually acceptable data;
                                                
19Proceedings Asia-Pacific Workshop on Safety in Biotechnology, 6 - 8 March 1995, Bangkok, Thailand.
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* Promote an effective and attractive information programme on safety in
biotechnology for dissemination to the public;
36.   Central and Eastern European Conference.   This Conference was attended by 36
experts from 10 Central and Eastern European countries together with 27 experts from
Africa, Asia, Latin America, Central America, North America and Europe and from UNEP
and the OECD.    The structure was again similar to that of the other regional conferences
with three sections:
* Sharing knowledge and experience with regional cooperation on safety in
biotechnology and with mechanisms for safety in biotechnology;
* Addressing national and regional approaches of risk assessment, risk management
and regional cooperation;
* Implementation.
The proceedings20 contain papers on the state of the art in biosafety in Central and Eastern
Europe, Southern Africa, Asia, North America, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Europe
together with individual papers on Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and
Ukraine.
37.    The Conference Statement noted that there was consensus on a number of important
issues and said that
Recognizing
- The potential of biotechnology to contribute to sustainable development in
fields such as food production, health care, and environmental protection;
- The importance of adequate biosafety mechanisms;
- The need for capacity-building on safety in biotechnology in the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe, to facilitate, among others, compliance with
international obligations;
- The effectiveness and catalytic effect of internationally coordinated actions;
- The importance of raising awareness in the scientific community and with
policy makers regarding safety in biotechnology;
- The importance of addressing public information and perception.
The participants recommended
....
- The harmonization of approaches in biosafety, including:
* regulatory frameworks and technical guidelines on the basis of 
internationally accepted guidelines
                                                
20Proceedings Central and Eastern European Conference for Regional and International Cooperation in Safety
on Biotechnology, 4 - 6 September 1995, Keszthely, Hungary.
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* work towards mutual acceptability of data, including harmonised
lists of classified organisms;
- National and regional efforts:
* to increase the awareness and knowledge of the scientific community
and policy makers regarding safety in biotechnology;
*  strengthening relevant training programmes for authorities and 
scientists;
* addressing public perception of biotechnology;
- That these activities should be coordinated on a regional basis through a
regional mechanism, which should facilitate information exchange, capacity
building and training programmes.
38.  Second Central and Eastern European Conference.   This was attended by 39 experts
from 13 Central and Eastern European countries together with 13 experts from Europe, North
America, UNEP, industry and the Biotechnology Advisory Commission of the Stockholm
Environment  Institute.   The proceedings21 contain papers from Central and Eastern Europe
presenting progress reports on the state of the art of biotechnology and biosafety in Albania,
Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russian Federation, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.   A useful summary
table22 is included on the progress of legislation  (as of October 1996) in the Central and
Eastern European countries:
Parameter\Country A BG BL Cz H LA LI PL RO RU SK SL U YU
Biodiversity
    Convention x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Gene Law x x? x
Biotechnology
  Committee x x x x x x x x
EU
  member
  associate
  declaration
x x x
x x
x x x
OECD
  member
  associate
  declaration
x
x x x
x
National system
  registration
  guidelines
  permits
x
x
x
x
x
x
                                                
21Proceedings 2nd Central and Eastern European Conference for Regional and International Cooperation on
Safety in Biotechnology, 16 - 18 October 1996, Smolenice, Slovak Republic.
22Tomasz Twardowski & Stanislaw Bielecki, State of the Art in Biosafety in Central and Eastern Europe
(Results from Country Reports), Proceedings 2nd Central and Eastern European Conference for Regional and
International Cooperation on Safety in Biotechnology, 16 - 18 October 1996, Smolenice, Slovak Republic, 11 -
15.
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Releases of GMO
  plants
  animals
x x x
x
x
x - done;  x? - partially done
The paper notes that contained use experiments and contained use for commercial production
using genetically modified organisms are not included in the table.
39.   Another paper23 compares the regulatory structures and practices in the EU member
countries in October 1996.   The summary table reproduced below notes that Greece and
Luxembourg did not respond although data are included for Norway and Switzerland:
Country Implementatio
n of Directive
90/220
Competent
Authorities
Number in
Competent
Authority
Budget
US $
Advisory
Body
Public
Participation
*
Belgium
law, decrees in
preparation
Mins of
Agric,
Health &
Env
6 200,000 Yes No
(inf only)
Denmark by law and
statutory orders
EPA 4 Not known No Yes
Germany by law Robt Koch
Institute,
local States
many No special
budget
Yes Yes
Spain by law Min of Env,
Health,
Agric
10 300,000 Yes No
France by law,
11 decrees
Min of
Agric, Env
3 1,000,000
inc salaries
Yes No
(inf only)
Ireland by law EPA 10 60,000
Irish £s
Yes No
(inf only)
Italy by law Min of
Health
3 50,000 Yes If necessary
Netherlands by decree Min of Env 6 1,000,000 Yes Yes
Austria
by law,
1 decree
Min of
Health,
Science, Env
6 100,000 Yes Yes
Portugal by decree Min of Env 1 Not known No No
                                                
23Helmut Gaugitsch, A Comparison of Regulatory Structures and Practices in the EU Member Countries
(Results from a Questionnaire), Proceedings 2nd Central and Eastern European Conference for Regional and
International Cooperation on Safety in Biotechnology, 16 - 18 October 1996, Smolenice, Slovak Republic, 17 -
19.
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Finland by law and
regulation
Board for
Gene Tech
7 200,000 Yes No
(inf only)
Sweden by law and
regulation
many 15 Not known Yes No
(inf only)
UK by law and
regulation
Dept of Env,
HSE
8 1,500,000 Yes No
(inf only)
Norway by law and
regulation
Min of Env 5 Not known Yes If necessary
Switzerland
by law and
regulation
Federal
Office of
Env, Health,
Agric, Vet
2 200,000 Yes No
       * Public participation indicates whether such participation in the handling of notifications is a legal requirement.
40.   The Conference Statement noted that considerable progress had been made in the
implementation of some aspects of biosafety in biotechnology in the region of Central and
Eastern Europe.  The participants recommended:
* To continue and strengthen regional cooperation on biosafety...
* To implement adequate and flexible biosafety mechanisms in the countries of the
region as soon as possible in order to take full advantage from the potentials of
biotechnology;
....
* that UNEP should continue its valuable role in promoting implementation of
biosafety mechanisms in Central and Eastern Europe using the UNEP Guidelines as
a model and promoting capacity building.
The UNEP contribution to this Conference emphasised the importance of capacity building
setting out the requirements for capacity building at both the national and international level.
It also outlined a regulatory concern without offering solutions by noting that
"A large number of countries have no national safety frameworks regulating living
modified organisms resulting from biotechnology.   The situation has led to
regulatory concerns in many countries....Some feel that advances in techniques and
ideas for application are proceeding in the absence of appropriate regulatory
mechanisms.  Biotechnology industry feels that too much attention is being paid to
remote and negligible risks, and that excessive regulation could limit biotechnology
research and application.   Questions arise regarding the capacity of existing
regulatory approaches and institutions to address issues related to safety in
biotechnology."
Discussion and Conclusions
40.   It is therefore apparent that following the Rio Summit in June 1992 and the entry into
force of the Convention on Biological Diversity in December 1993, there is immense ongoing
international activity in all regions of the world to improve biosafety in biotechnology and to
build capacity.   An overall appreciation of this is shown by the figure below which indicates
the inter-relationship betwen the various activities.
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Year Event
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Rio Summit
Convention on Biological Diversity
Entry into Force
Conference of Parties
Conference of Parties
Conference of Parties
Biosafety
BSWG
BSWG
BSWG
BSWG
 Advance Informed 
Agreement Protocol
BSWG
BSWG
International Guidelines 
         on Biosafety
Regional Conferences
Regional Conferences
BSWG
  These are all driven by an international awareness of the potential dangers to the
environment and to public health that may result from the release of micro-organisms with
novel traits into the environment.  The international strategy has been to pursue a two-track
approach -- first to adopt and apply the UNEP International Technical Guidelines for Safety
in Biotechnology and second to carry forward the negotiations for a Biosafety Protocol which
are planned to be completed in 1998.
41.   There is an awareness in all of these activities of the importance of raising public
awareness of the measures being adopted to protect the environment and public health and so
to address the public perception of biotechnology.    Whilst these initiatives  go under the
heading of biosafety or safety in biotechnology, they are all focussed on safety issues related
to living modified organisms.   It is, however, clearly recognised that the risks posed by
modified organisms are similar in kind to those posed by any other organism and are thus
based on those posed by the parent or baseline organism and the nature of the novel traits that
have been introduced into that organism.   Consequently, the basic framework for biosafety
should be based on that for unmodified organisms.
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42.   The developments to establish information exchange and advance informed agreement
prior to transborder transfers of living modified organisms are such that they will contribute
to increased international transparency and to improved public confidence that such
organisms are being handled and used safely without undue risk to the environment or to
public health.   Such improved transparency and enhanced confidence that such organisms are
being used safely for permitted purposes can contribute to improving international confidence
that States are in compliance with the BTWC.    These activities to enhance biosafety in
biotechnology should be regarded as building blocks that can be drawn upon in devising
measures to strengthen the implementation of the BTWC.
